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Introduction
Why is it important to assess North America’s integration
potential? Regional integration is one method countries use to
solve commonly held problems, such as migration, security, and
development. Migration, security, and development can be viewed
as inter-related problems because they have in common the quest
for a stable environment where individuals’ and states’
objectives can be realized. Individuals will choose to exit when
they perceive the lack of economic opportunities and/or physical
security in their home countries and believe that there are
ample quantities of these two items in a neighboring country
(Chang 1998). States seek to control immigration in order to
maximize security and development in their countries (Rudolph
2003). Political development also helps in the area of security
by reducing the likelihood of civil conflict (Collier and
Hoeffler 2002) and external threats (Kugler et al. 1997).
Economic development reduces the likelihood that individuals
will seek the exit strategy. It also increases the likelihood
that states will experience domestic stability and favorable
relations
with
neighboring
states.
Economic
development,
therefore, becomes the linchpin in solving the associated
problems of migration and security.
The solution to the migration-security-development issue can
therefore be conceptualized as a collective good because
benefits are spread to all those involved, although not
necessarily equally. However, collective goods are achieved
through collective action, which is often difficult to carry out
(Olson 1965). What are the main problems for achieving
collective action and what form would this action take? Although
there are many views associated with the collective action
problem (Olson 1965; see also Ostrom 1990), I will focus on
transaction costs with attention on how homogenous institutions
lower such costs. Transaction costs are costs borne by firms
when they operate in a foreign political and economic
environment.
Differences
between
the
home
and
foreign
environment increase costs due to the need for firms to adjust.
Also, with increased transaction costs comes uncertainty of
success since they will be departing from what is known to what
is unknown. These extra costs can discourage firms from
requesting that politicians deepen integration, thereby leading
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to little or no action. In assessing North America’s current and
future state of integration, it is important to examine the
compatibility of the three partners in light of transaction
costs.
Collective action can take the form of regional integration.
Regional integration is the establishment of collective decision
making among states for the intention of establishing and
regulating market flows (Haas 1958; Lindberg 1970). Market flows
are the entries and exits of the factors of production (except
land), as well as goods and services. The degree of integration
refers to the degree of collective decision making. At one end
is an intergovernmental arrangement in which states make common
decisions but are autonomous in regulating those decisions. If a
regional authority does exist, it serves at the pleasure of the
individual states. On the opposite end is the supranational
arrangement, in which regional institutions do exist and make
decisions alongside intergovernmental arrangements or supersede
member-states’ authority.
Conditions of Regional Integration
The
literature
provides
several
important
variables
for
explaining the levels of integration. The power theories
indicate that the asymmetric distribution of power is a more
favorable condition for integration than a grouping of similarly
powerful actors (Krasner 1976; Mattli 1999; Gilpin 1987 & 2001;
Efird and Genna 2002; Genna and Hiroi 2004, 2005 & 2007). This
is due to the ability of the preponderant power to coordinate
efforts and distribute incentives to other members. In other
words, the region must include a capable leader.
Next is the compatibility of actors. Having a powerful regional
neighbor alone cannot help the development of integration if
there is wide preference disagreement (Efird and Genna 2002).
Although the powerful country could force preferences on others
in the region, the outcome would resemble an empire rather than
a voluntary association of countries. In order to form a
cohesive unit, political and economic environments must be
similar in order to reduce transaction costs (Feng and Genna
2003). Without compatibility, firms will assume a cost of having
to adjust to foreign environments. Therefore, firms would prefer
that regional integration develop between compatible actors so
that the costs are low. The inclusion of firms in this
explanation follows theories involving interactions between
domestic groups and the interests represented in government
policies (Genna and Hiroi 2004).
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Institutional homogeneity can deepen integration for two
reasons. One is the perceived reduction of the costs due to the
effects that identity politics has on cooperation. Prior
research has demonstrated that states that have a similar
political identity also have similar policy preferences (Souva
2004). Institutions can be defined as the set of rules and
procedures that are deemed appropriate by the political leaders
(March and Olsen 1984). Given this definition, individuals are
assumed to make decisions based on institutional values (Peters
1999). Similar institutions breed ideological similarities since
they share a “co-evolutionary process” (Denzau and North 1994).
Norms and institutions reinforce one another, and therefore a
country’s institutions are viewed as the expected expression of
their norms (Maoz and Russett 1993). Similar institutions,
therefore, will correlate with similar preferences.
The identity factor also provides a decision-making short cut
that would facilitate cooperation because it greatly simplifies
a rather complex set of cognitive processes. Research into the
dynamics of in-group and out-group behavior has shown that
cooperation is easier among those that share an identity than
those that do not (Tajfel 1978). Simply being viewed as “one of
us” will elicit the type of cooperation that would also include
resource allocations (Tajfel 1978). This not only holds for
individuals, but states as well. For example, Werner and Lemke
(1997) demonstrate that alliances are more likely among similar
states. With a similar identity, actors believe that cooperation
is easier due to lower transaction costs.
A material mechanism is another reason for why similar
institutions
can
improve
the
deepening
of
integration.
Entrepreneurs are faced with two realities; parts of their
business enterprises are controllable and others are not. The
controllable parts are those within their firms and operations.
They include personnel, marketing, physical operations, etc.
Those that they cannot control are found outside the firm. These
factors are the political, economic, and social factors of a
country. For example, a firm cannot control the economic climate
at any given time. Also, they cannot control the institutional
arrangement of a foreign country. There have been examples of
large
firms
influencing
regulations
especially
in
small
countries, but firms in general can at best lobby for their
preferences at the margin. They are not believed to have the
ability to produce revolutionary institutional change in a given
country. Given this, firms are less likely to demand regional
integration
with
neighbors
that
do
not
share
similar
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institutions because needing to adapt
introduces greater costs and uncertainty.

to

new

environments

In sum, power preponderance and compatibility are the main
conditions
associated
with
the
deepening
of
regional
integration. A regional leader is needed for guiding the
processes using available capabilities. Compatibility promotes
the idea that states are similar enough in either perceived or
material terms not to add additional transaction costs.
Hypothesis Testing
I test the hypotheses using a panel time series linear
regression technique that assumes correlated panels. Since such
data properties produce inaccurate standard errors, a correction
method is used (Beck and Katz 1995). AR(1) autocorrelation is
assumed and the unit of analysis are the regional integration
organizations from 1975-2004. The timeframe is bounded by data
availability. The variables measuring regional integration,
power preponderance, and institutional homogeneity are lagged by
five years given the hypothesized direction of association.1 Five
year lags were chosen in order to reduce endogeneity problems,
to work with some data issues (see below), and to focus on a
long-term examination. Control variables (see below) are lagged
by one year while the regional dummy variables are not lagged.
The remainder of this section describes the variables used in
the model with the following specifications:
Integrationt = 1 + 1Power Preponderancet-5 + 2Institutional
Homogeneityt-5 + nControlst-1 + t
The operationalization of regional integration is a systematic
coding so that the analysis can distinguish varying levels while
still comparing similar attributes. This is done by using a
multidimensional measurement referred to as the integration
achievement score (IAS), which was first developed by Hufbauer
and Schott (1994) and later refined and applied in Efird and
Genna 2002 (see also Efird, Genna, and Kugler 2003; Feng and
Genna 2003; and Genna and Hiroi 2004). It gauges the level of
1

Lagged dependent variables were not used because as Achen (2001) points out,
lagged dependent variables will dominate the results thereby destroying the
effect of other variables when included with heavily trending exogenous
variables and disturbances, regardless if the lagged dependent variable has
any true causal power or not. In addition, the interest in this study is not
in the change or growth in the level of integration, but the level of
integration at a given time period. The lagged independent variables were
included to better account for causality.
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regional integration by looking at six categories commonly
attributable to regionalism: (1) trade in goods and services,
(2) degree of capital mobility, (3) degree of labor mobility,
(4) level of supranational institution importance, (5) degree of
monetary policy coordination, and (6) degree of fiscal policy
coordination. Each of the six categories is also broken down
into five levels along a Guttman scale. The measure is an equal
weighted average of the six categories. The potential range of
the score is from zero to five. Zero represents no formal
regional integration in place and five represents a complete
merger of markets, including all economic factors, and political
decision-making.
Power preponderance is relatively simple to operationalize using
GDP data (in constant US dollars) from the World Development
Indicators (2005). I calculate the variable by dividing the GDP
of the largest economy by the sum of the GDPs of all remaining
members.
I operationalize institutional homogeneity using World Bank’s
Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2001) An index
was created using three variables: “Legislative Indices of
Electoral Competitiveness,” “Executive Indices of Electoral
Competitiveness,” and “Checks and Balances.” A confirmatory
factor analysis of the three variables indicated a strong
association with a single latent variable (alpha=0.83). The
values for each country were summed and a standard deviation was
taken for each regional integration organization.
The data analysis also includes the following control variables.
The first is the presence of an ongoing crisis between members
of the regional integration association. Intuitively, one would
suspect
that
integration
would
not
deepen
under
such
circumstances. The data come from the International Crisis
Behavior dataset (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000). The variable has
a value of zero for the absence of an ongoing crisis and one
otherwise. The second control, which is also found in the
International Crisis Behavior dataset, is the presence of a new
crisis during the year. Like ongoing crisis, a new crisis may
threaten current or future integration efforts. The variable has
a value of zero for no new crisis and one otherwise. The age of
regional integration organization was also included because
older organizations are more likely to have deeper integration.
Integration may deepen due to the political will or persistent
effort. The number of members was also included. Larger
memberships may encounter greater collective action problems,
which makes coordination among member states challenging.
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Finally, regions could possess specific attributes that may
influence the level of integration. I include regional dummy
variables for Europe, Latin America, 2 the Middle East, and
Africa. Asia is the baseline region.
Results
The regression model estimates the relationship of regional
integration
around
the
world
with
power
asymmetry
and
institutional homogeneity while controlling for other factors.
Overall the results support the hypothesis.
Table 1. OLS (AR1) Regression with Correlated Panels Corrected Standard
Errors
IAS
Power Preponderance (t-5)

0.022**

Standard
Error
0.011

Institutional Variables
DPI Index, standard deviation (t-5)

0.017**

0.007

Controls
ICB On Going Crisis (t-1)
-0.010
0.028
ICB New Crisis (t-1)
-0.001
0.018
Regional Organization Age (t-1)
0.015***
0.002
Regional Organization Membership Size
-0.007***
0.002
(t-1)
Europe
1.42***
0.086
Latin America
0.635***
0.088
Middle East
0.428***
0.140
Africa
0.183**
0.089
Constant
0.437***
0.073
Observations
534
R2
0.346
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(one-tailed tests; except regional dummies which are two-tailed);
the standard deviation variables were transformed (the negative
of the standard deviation) so that the indices now measure
institutional homogeneity.

Table one presents the estimation results. The model one
supports the hypothesis that a regional leader and homogeneous
institutions among member-states are positively associated with
the level of integration. The power preponderance variable is
significant at the 95% confidence level (one-tail test). If the
regional leader is as large as all other member-states combined
(a ratio equal to one) then the level of integration is small.
2

I code NAFTA in the Latin America regional dummy.
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At the maximum value of the power preponderance variable found
in the data (~11), the effect would be 0.24 or a ten-fold
increase from the value of parity. At the smallest value of
preponderance found in the data (~0.17) the effect would be
0.0037 or an 83% decrease from parity. Institutional homogeneity
is significant at the 95% confidence level. From the variable’s
lowest value to its highest value, the level of integration
increases by 100%. The next column displays the results with the
EFW measure for institutional homogeneity as the dependent
variable. The integration score does help explain the level of
homogeneity, but power preponderance does not. This finding, in
association with the first model, points to power preponderance
affecting the level of homogeneity indirectly, i.e. through its
effect on the level of integration.
Implications for North American Integration
This analysis indicates that the optimal conditions for regional
integration to develop are the presence of a preponderant power
and compatibility among the member states. The condition of
power asymmetry was demonstrated with the finding that the
larger the GDP ratios (between the regional leader and the sum
of all other members), the greater the regional integration
score. The necessary condition of institutional compatibility
was also demonstrated by the findings. Recall that these tests
demonstrate a general relationship and not one that is exclusive
to North America. Assuming that North American integration is
not unique and is therefore comparable to all other cases, the
general results give us an opportunity to see how North America
compares with all other cases of regional integration. From this
comparison, it becomes possible to make recommendations for
deepening integration. The next step is to examine the estimated
models in the North American case.
One of the key variables, power asymmetry, is clearly present in
the region. The GDP ratio between the US and Canada during 19891993 was between 9.8-10.8. After the implementation of NAFTA,
the ratio between the US and the other two partners varies
between from 6.8 – 8.4. The data indicates a fairly wide
variation in the homogeneity variables. The standard deviation
of NAFTA’s DPI values ranges from 2.08-0.58. This section will
examine the effect of this variable has on North American
cooperation.
Table two displays calculated North American integration
scenarios using varying values of power preponderance and
institutional homogeneity indicators. We begin with a baseline
7
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Table 2. North American Integration Scenarios
Scenarios
Integration Score
2004
1.34
Low End Values
1.17
High End Values
1.50
Institutional Homogeneity (15 years)
2.32
Institutional Homogeneity (30 years)
2.55

examination before discussing potential scenarios that could
deepen North American integration. The 2004 estimated value for
NAFTA is 1.34 while the actual value is 1.67. Therefore we will
need to keep in mind that the model underestimates the
integration score’s value when examining future estimated
values. The next entry includes North American values at the low
end of the range for all the independent variables, while the
third entry includes high end values. Note that these entries
represent hypothetical scenarios; the actual data do not have
these combinations of values. The point is to determine the
bounded values of integration given historical precedence before
expanding to other scenarios. At the historically lowest values,
the predicted integration score is approximately 1.17. Using the
European Union as a substantive comparison, the EU scored a
value of one just before the implementation of the Treaty of
Rome (1957). At this time the EU was a partial free trade area
that
also
allowed
foreign
capital
withdrawal.
Regional
institutions were limited to information gathering and had
advisory roles. At NAFTA’s historically highest values, the
estimated score is 1.50. This value represents a substantive
change in the level of integration because it requires a one
point increase in at least three categories of composite index.
For example, the score increase could represent a change to a
full free trade area, the ability for full access for foreign
investment
and
capital
withdrawal
(except
for
national
government
procurement),
and
the
ability
for
regional
institutions to amend member state proposals.
The next entries in table two provide results given improvements
to institutional homogeneity between the three countries at
different ages of NAFTA. I keep the power ratio at seven and
also hold the membership at three. If the three had achieved
perfect homogeneity when NAFTA turned 15 years old (in 2009), it
is estimated that the value would be 2.32. Recall that the model
underestimates the values, so this is a conservative estimate.
What could such a value represent? Let’s again use the EU as a
comparative example. It achieved this value in 1972 as the
member-states began their earliest efforts in developing the
common currency. The EU was a customs union, provided full
access for foreign investment (except for national government
8
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procurement), allowed capital withdrawal from member states,
labor mobility among nationals of member states, included
regional institutions that had the ability to amend proposals,
and required member states to commitment to maintain parity in
currency values. Therefore a one point increase in the
integration score represents a great deal of change from NAFTA’s
2004 score. Thinking into the future, what would NAFTA look like
if member states achieve perfect institutional homogeneity when
it turns 30 years old (in 2024)? The estimated value is 2.55,
which is similar to the value of the EU in 1975.3 In 1975, the EU
improved
integration
since
1972
by
allowing
European
institutions to veto proposals.
Conclusion
The literature on regional integration has fashioned various
theories and empirical findings. The conditions distilled in
this paper are power asymmetry and partner compatibility. First,
I evaluated the empirical validity of these conditions and then
compared the general models with the North American experience.
My goal was to assess North America’s potential for deepening
integration; does it have the “right stuff” to develop
agreements that furthers integration? The rationale is that
collective action through trilateral agreements would be the
most effective way to solve the migration-security-development
issue.
The general findings confirm that specific conditions are
needed. First is the presence of a regional leader. The
statistical results show that greater asymmetry is associated
with greater levels of integration in general. The presence of
the leader was theorized to be necessary in order to solve some
problems of collective action (coordinate efforts and distribute
incentives). However valid this variable is in general, it does
not extensively help us to explain North American integration
since the US has been a regional (and global) preponderant power
for some time.
The second condition was compatibility of members. The results
indicate that domestic institutional homogeneity is a good
predictor for integration. It is in this area that we see a good
deal of variation among the North American states. Compatibility
is stronger in the northern partnership than the southern
partnership, which produced an unbalanced compatibility problem.
Therefore the policy recommendations are geared to improving the
3

The actual value was 3.167.
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compatibility
between
integration is desired.

Mexico

and

Canada-US

if

further

One set of recommendations involves homogenizing institutions.
There are two points here. The first is the effort to improve
democratic institutions in Mexico. Mexico is already on upward
trajectory in this area, but still falls short. Given the high
levels of corruption, democratic institutions have credibility
problems. Also the Mexican president’s powers are not as
constrained as those of the executives from Canada and the US.
The second recommendation is to reduce the differences involving
legal
structures,
the
security
of
property
rights,
and
regulation
of
labor
and
business.
Regarding
the
legal
structures, the deepening of integration would benefit from the
Mexican judiciary becoming more independent, impartial, and
increasing its integrity. Also, there will need to be some sort
of convergence in the protection of property rights. Regarding
the regulation of labor and business, there needs to be a
convergence in the regulation of workers’ rights regarding
hiring and terminating employment. Work also needs to be done in
converging business regulations and the reduction of the use of
bribes in Mexico.
Overall, North America does not currently have the appropriate
conditions that would improve integration at the moment. While a
power asymmetry is in place, the compatibility of three partners
is unbalanced. But a two-pronged policy of improving homogeneity
while increasing integration can very well promote a virtuous
cycle that continues to unite the economies and decision making
of the three countries. The need to solve problems like the
migration-security-development issue requires collective action
because
unilateral
action
thus
far
has
proven
to
be
unsuccessful. The limiting factor of the three issues is
development, which integration has the potential to solve. By
recognizing that the problem is a commonly held one, the three
partners can begin to seek out the conditions, and make the
appropriate adjustments, for cooperation to develop. Otherwise
we will see future elections that mechanically focus on
solutions that do not produce results.
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